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THE NEW WORLD ORDER: FINANCIAL 
GUARANTY COMPANY RESTRUCTURING 




For over a century, insurance company receivership in the United States 
has looked much the same. The affairs of insurance companies are 
concluded or “wound up” in a receivership proceeding by the state 
insurance regulator under the supervision of a state court. The proceeding is 
long, cumbersome, and strictly statutory. Most celebrated insurance 
insolvency cases are either large life insurance company failures that burn 
brightly and then flame out, or property casualty failures that seemingly 
smolder forever in the morass of long-tailed asbestos or environmental 
claims. In the last two years, however, a strange breed of insurance 
company, the financial guaranty company, has come under attack. Huge 
exposures to residential mortgage-backed investments swamped their 
traditional business of guaranteeing the principal and interest payments on 
municipal bonds. These cases have changed the entire rubric of insurance 
insolvency. The traditional rules about the relative priorities of creditors, 
the benchmarking of the rehabilitation proceedings against liquidation 
valuations, the encroaching federal influence in a state process, and the 
sanctity of the aleatory contract between a carrier and its insured have all 
been tested. Before discussing the financial guarantors, it is helpful to first 
look at the historical framework of insurance insolvency. 
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP 
The insurance regulatory system in the United States is governed, 
almost entirely, by state law. This system developed immediately following 
the U.S. Civil War when the U.S. Supreme Court declared that insurance 
regulation was beyond the reach of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers. 
The Court reasoned that the sale of insurance was not “a transaction of 
commerce.”1 In 1944, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, 
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 1. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868). 
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recognizing that insurance did, in fact, constitute interstate commerce, and 
could therefore be regulated by Congress.2 In response, Congress rapidly 
passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act (McCarran-Ferguson or the Act), which 
codified the primacy of state insurance regulation.3  
The Act recognizes the authority of state insurance laws over federal 
laws in most circumstances. Specifically, the Act prevents the preemption 
of state insurance laws by federal laws that are not specifically targeted at 
insurance. The Act states in pertinent part, “No Act of Congress shall be 
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State 
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a 
fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the 
business of insurance . . . .”4  
Each state has its own system for administering an insolvent insurance 
company. The systems adopted by various states, however, are quite similar 
because they are based on model laws. Moreover, states frequently adopt 
the language of other states’ legislation. The model laws are promulgated 
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC),5 and the 
National Conference of Insurance Legislators, 6 in an attempt to make the 
system more uniform. The NAIC has historically proposed, and many states 
have adopted, the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Model Act.7 
More recently, however, the NAIC has promulgated the Insurance 
Receivership Model Act, which has only been adopted by a few states.8 
While any participant in a proceeding in a particular state must be familiar 
with that state’s laws, the model laws may serve as a guide for what may be 
encountered at the state level. 
There are essentially two basic types of judicial proceedings that a 
troubled insurer may be ordered into. The first type of proceeding is a 
reorganization of the company wherein it continues to operate under court 
supervision.9 This type of proceeding is called a “rehabilitation” or 
“conservation,” depending on the state. While the insurer continues to 
operate, a receiver (generally an agent of the state insurance commissioner) 
displaces management. Historically, few insurers emerge from 
rehabilitation, despite the name of the procedure. Once an insurer loses 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1945). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006). 
 5. See generally Model Categories Index, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE 
COMMISSIONERS, http://www.naic.org/committees_index_model_description.htm (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2011). 
 6. See generally History and Purpose, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF INSURANCE 
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 7. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-903 (2009). 
 8. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 443.001 (West 2007). 
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public confidence, it is hard to regain it.10 Rehabilitation, although different 
in many ways, is somewhat analogous to a corporate reorganization under 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
The second form of proceeding consists of a court-supervised winding 
up and liquidation of the insurer.11 In a liquidation proceeding, notice is 
provided to policyholders that their policies will be cancelled. Then, 
reinsurance is collected, assets are liquidated, and creditors are paid 
according to specific statutory priorities. Liquidation bears some 
resemblance to an insurance liquidation proceeding in the United Kingdom 
or a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.12 As noted 
below, one of the fundamental differences between these proceedings and a 
corporate bankruptcy is the priority given to policyholder claims over the 
claims of most other creditors. 
Of great importance is the priority structure that governs the order in 
which claims are paid. One priority level must be fully discharged before 
the next can be paid. The system can vary from state to state, but the 
general structure remains the same.13 Like bankruptcy, the expenses of 
administration are paid first and equity holders are paid last.14 The 
similarity, however, ends there. In many states, expenses of the state 
guaranty fund come second, followed by policyholder claims and 
policyholder-related claims of the guaranty funds.15 Next come the federal 
government claims and certain limited employee claims.16 Finally, after a 
small number of miscellaneous government claims are paid, the general 
creditors are paid.17 This class typically includes ceding insurance 
companies that were reinsured by the failed insurer.18 The priority of 
reinsurance creditors is uniform across all states, but some states explicitly 
relegate reinsurance creditors to general creditor priority by statute, while 
others rely on the common law.19 The last time a state court deviated from 
this principle, that court’s decision was promptly reversed on appeal.20 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 441.001(a) (West 2007) (“An insurer delinquency, or the 
state’s inability to properly proceed in a threatened delinquency, directly or indirectly affects other 
insurers by creating a lack of public confidence in insurance and insurers.”). 
 11. See In re Liquidation of Midland Ins. Co., 947 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (N.Y. 2011) (discussing 
liquidation). 
 12. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–785 (2006), with The Insurers (Winding Up) Rules, 2001, S.I. 
2001/3635 (U.K.). 
 13. Compare N.Y. INS. LAW § 7434 (McKinney 2005) (requiring the payment to state and 
local governments ahead of general creditors), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-944 (2009) (having 
a separate class for administrative expenses of insurance guaranty associations). 
 14. Compare N.Y. INS. LAW § 7434(a)(1)(i), with 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(C).  
 15. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 7434(a)(1)(ii). 
 16. See id. § 7434(a)(1)(iii)–(iv). 
 17. See id. § 7434(a)(1)(vi). 
 18. See id.  
 19. See, e.g., Covington v. Ohio Gen. Ins. Co., No. 01AP-213, 2001 WL 1013126 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Sept. 6, 2001), rev’d, 99 Ohio St. 3d 117 (2003). 
 20. See id.  
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Finally, as noted above, equity holders come last.21 The U.S. government 
has consistently challenged any exceptions to the Federal Priority Statute,22 
a statute that grants the government first priority in all insolvencies outside 
those governed by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.23 The U.S. Supreme Court, 
however, held that under certain state statutes that protect insurance 
policyholders, states may prioritize policyholders over the federal 
government.24 
A common aspect of the insurance insolvency system in the United 
States is the supremacy of the state receivership court. State insurance 
statutes generally prohibit the bringing of any type of action against an 
insolvent insurer in any court other than the state receivership court 
administering the insolvency.25 Removal to a federal court is generally not 
available because of the primacy of state regulation under McCarran-
Ferguson.26 
II. THE BOND INSURERS CHANGE THE GAME 
When we think about financial guaranty insurance companies, two 
large players come to mind: the American Municipal Bond Assurance 
Corporation and the Municipal Bond Insurance Association. These 
organizations were founded in the 1970s to provide credit enhancement for 
municipal bonds. These entities guaranteed the payment of interest and 
principal when a municipality was unable to meet the debt service on its 
bonds.27 This development aided small or more risky public finance issuers’ 
ability to tap the capital markets using the highest credit rating—Aaa from 
Moody’s or AAA from Standard and Poor’s (S&P).28 Thus, bond liquidity 
increased as more buyers became eligible.29 Over time, one of these two 
giants became Ambac Assurance Corporation. Eventually, other companies 
joined this business, including the Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, 
Financial Security Assurance (now known as Assured Guaranty Municipal 
Corp.), Syncora (formerly known as XL Capital Assurance, Inc.), Radian 
Asset Assurance Inc. (formerly part of Enhance Financial Services Group, 
Inc.), CIFG Assurance North America, Inc., ACA Financial Guaranty 
Corp., and Assured Guaranty Ltd. 
                                                                                                                 
 21. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) (2006). 
 22. 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a) (2000). 
 23. Id.  
 24. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 492 (1993). 
 25. See Knickerbocker Agency, Inc. v. Holz, 149 N.E.2d 885, 890 (N.Y. 1958) (“Hence other 
courts, except when called upon by the court of primary jurisdiction for assistance, are excluded 
from participation.”). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006). 
 27. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901 (McKinney 2005). 
 28. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 14, In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-00411) [hereinafter Class Action Complaint]. 
 29. Id.  
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The basic business of a bond insurer relies on its high credit rating.30 
The credit rating models, however, put significant emphasis on size and 
market share.31 With the municipal bond business experiencing limited 
growth and increased competition, the financial guaranty companies looked 
for new ways to grow. They began to provide their guaranties to 
securitizations of many asset classes—most significantly, residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).32 They also began to provide credit 
protection to various financial counterparties in the form of credit default 
swaps (CDSs).33 These swaps referenced single credits or, alternatively, 
pools of assets, which were often synthetic and referencing RMBS.34 Since 
insurance companies generally cannot enter into derivative transactions 
without hedging investment exposure,35 the financial guaranty companies 
formed subsidiaries that entered into CDSs with sophisticated financial 
counterparties. The insurance entity would then provide a guaranty of its 
subsidiary’s performance under the CDS.36 
When the RMBS market began to disintegrate, the financial guaranty 
companies began to stumble because they were exceptionally leveraged to 
these securities, thereby launching a vicious cycle of credit rating 
downgrades. These downgrades had a number of consequences, including a 
loss of new business, and the establishment of requirements to post 
collateral in transactions that required additional collateral upon downgrade 
of the financial guarantor.37 Moreover, sometimes CDSs came with 
penalties for rating downgrades and very expensive mark-to-market 
damages upon early termination.38 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 14–18.  
 31. ARLENE ISAACS-LOWE ET AL., MOODY’S RATING METHODOLOGY FOR THE FINANCIAL 
GUARANTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY REPORT NO. 98408 6–7 (Moody’s Investors Service Sept. 
2006). 
 32. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 28, at 3; Disclosure Statement Accompanying 
Plan of Rehabilitation at 3–4, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance 
Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Disclosure 
Statement]. 
 33. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 35 (Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Ambac 
2007 10-K]. 
 34. Class Action Complaint, supra note 28, at 23. 
 35. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 1410 (McKinney 2005). 
 36. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Bank Insureds at 1–3, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account 
of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar. 24, 2010) 
[hereinafter Bank of Insureds Amicus Brief]. 
 37. Brief in Opposition to RMBS Policyholders’ and LVM Bondholders’ Emergency Motions 
for Injunctive and Other Relief at 13, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac 
Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. May 20, 2010); Ambac 2007 10-K, 
supra note 33, at 25, 29. 
 38. When a swap is terminated early, the transaction is generally termed “mark-to-market,” 
meaning that a market valuation is made of the trade and any deficit found is payable 
immediately. When the RMBS crisis was at its bottom, the value of swap protection was very high 
because there was no market price for the underlying collateral. Even though many observers 
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Financial guaranty companies also had financial services businesses 
that provided guaranteed investment contracts or similar investment 
vehicles.39 These services provided vehicles for municipalities to invest 
proceeds from bond offerings and for synthetic securitizations to place 
funds raised, which would be available to pay losses if these were to 
occur.40 These contracts could also require posting of collateral in the event 
that the financial guaranty company providing the product experienced 
credit rating downgrades.41 
The financial guaranty companies faced losses on guarantees of RMBS, 
losses on CDSs referencing RMBS, and cash crunches resulting from credit 
rating downgrades.42 With these macro forces in mind, let us examine 
Wisconsin-domiciled Ambac Assurance Corporation (Ambac Assurance or 
together with its affiliates, Ambac).  
III. WISCONSIN DIVIDES AMBAC 
Wisconsin-domiciled Ambac Assurance Corporation suffered from the 
decline in value of RMBS. Ambac began as part of the mortgage insurer 
MGIC Investment Corp. (MGIC), whose brush with the Baldwin United 
fiasco in the early 1980s spun it off on its own independent course. Ambac 
prospered over the following quarter century until 2008 brought trouble. 
Today, Ambac is a subsidiary of Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (Ambac 
Financial or AFG).43 
The year 2008 was not kind to Ambac. In late 2007, both major rating 
agencies affirmed Ambac’s AAA ratings, but both warned of future 
downgrades.44 On June 5, 2008, S&P downgraded Ambac Assurance’s 
financial strength rating to AA, placing it on Credit Watch Negative.45 On 
June 19, 2008, Moody’s downgraded it to Aa3 with a negative outlook.46 
On November 5, 2008, Moody’s downgraded Ambac Assurance’s financial 
strength rating to Baa1, and on November 19, 2008, S&P lowered its rating 
of Ambac Assurance to A with a negative outlook.47 
                                                                                                                 
believed the market would recover before swaps expired, if a valuation was done at the bottom of 
the crisis, a substantial amount could be due upon termination. 
 39. Ambac 2007 10-K, supra note 33, at 27–30. 
 40. Id. at 29–30.  
 41. Id. at 25. 
 42. Id.  
 43. See generally Ambac Financial Group, Inc., ANSWERS.COM, http://www.answers.com 
/topic/ambac-financial-group-inc (last visited Oct. 1, 2011); see also Ambac Financial Group, 
Inc., FUNDINGUNIVERSE.COM, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Ambac-Finan 
cial-Group-Inc-Company-History.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (providing a history of Ambac). 
 44. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Mar. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Ambac 
2008 10-K].  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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These rating downgrades took their toll on Ambac. The December 31, 
2008 Ambac Assurance statutory statements show well over $1 billion 
flowing from Ambac Assurance to its affiliates, much of it to collateralize 
guaranteed investment contracts and other transactions requiring collateral 
after Ambac was downgraded.48 
In order to permit Ambac’s non-insurance affiliates to meet the colla-
teral posting obligations, Ambac Assurance asked its regulator, the Wiscon-
sin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI or the Commissioner), to 
permit certain “liquidity enhancing activities” between the non-insurance 
affiliates and the regulated insurance company. Finally, in early November 
2008, the OCI granted Ambac a “non-disapproval letter” with regard to a 
few liquidity-transferring transactions between a number of Ambac’s affili-
ates and the insurance company. These included: 
Ambac Assurance is permitted to purchase up to $3.0 billion of investment 
securities presently owned by the investment agreement business; 
Ambac Assurance is permitted to provide a revolving unsecured credit 
facility to the investment agreement business of up to $1.6 billion for the 
purpose of providing such affiliates liquidity for collateral postings or 
liquidation of investment agreements; 
Ambac Assurance is permitted to provide a revolving unsecured credit 
facility to Ambac Financial Services of not more than $750 million 
(subsequently increased to $850 million through March 31, 2009) for the 
purpose of providing liquidity for collateral postings or liquidation of 
interest rate and/or currency swap arrangements; and 
Under a separate non-disapproval, Ambac Assurance is permitted to lend 
up to $1.3 billion to the investment agreement business on a secured 
basis.49 
Ambac responded by discontinuing its credit derivatives business50 and 
announcing that it would attempt to revitalize a subsidiary called 
“Everspan” to write municipal finance guarantees.51 
Ambac tried to resuscitate itself; in 2008, Ambac Financial issued $1.25 
billion of common stock and $250 million of hybrid securities (comprised 
of a commitment to purchase common stock and approximately $240 
million in 9.5 percent senior notes) and raised $800 million from their 
contingent capital facilities.52 They put virtually all of this capital into its 
subsidiaries, including Ambac Assurance.53 
                                                                                                                 
 48. AMBAC ASSURANCE CORP., 2008 ANNUAL STATEMENT 14.4 (2008). 
 49. Ambac 2008 10-K, supra note 44, at 56.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 57.  
 52. Id. at 93, 99.  
 53. Id. at 172. 
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The flow of outbound claim payments could not be staunched. Between 
2003 and 2007, Ambac had only paid $177 million in gross claims, but in 
2008 alone, it paid $638 million, and recorded loss and loss adjustment 
expenses totaling $2.2 billion.54 In 2009, Ambac paid $1.7 billion, and 
recorded loss and loss adjustment expenses totaling $2.8 billion ($589 
million and $1.4 billion in 2008 and 2009, respectively, on a statutory 
basis).55 Ambac’s balance sheet crumbled. Investment losses on a statutory 
basis were $3.9 billion in 2008 and another $2.6 billion in 2009.56 
In March 2010, facing continued losses and deteriorating conditions, 
Ambac’s regulator, the OCI, responded by causing Ambac to form a 
“segregated account” (the Segregated Account).57 Life insurance companies 
commonly employ “separate accounts” to separate assets (generally on a 
small scale) for self-managed variable annuities or similar products.58 The 
assets in the separate account cannot be used to satisfy the general 
obligations of the insurer. Wisconsin’s segregated account statute59 was 
used in the final stages of the spectacular failure of Baldwin United that 
gave rise to the current MGIC and its former subsidiary Ambac.60 Under 
this construct, an insurer can separate an entire part of its business, not just 
individual accounts as described above. This is required for certain lines of 
business, including mortgage guaranty and financial guaranty lines. It is 
optional in other circumstances: 
(2) Optional segregated accounts. With the approval of the 
commissioner, a corporation may establish a segregated account for any 
part of its business. The commissioner shall approve unless he or she finds 
that the segregated account would be contrary to the law or to the interests 
of any class of insureds.61 
When a segregated account is formed from an existing business, it must 
have “adequate” capital and surplus: 
(3) Special provisions for segregated accounts. (a) Capital and surplus. 
The commissioner shall specify in the certificate of authority of a newly 
organized corporation the minimum capital or the minimum permanent 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. at 88–89.  
 55. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 84 (Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Ambac 
2009 10-K]; AMBAC ASSURANCE CO., 2009 ANNUAL STATEMENT 5 (2009) [hereinafter AMBAC 
2009 ANNUAL STATEMENT]. 
 56. AMBAC 2009 ANNUAL STATEMENT, supra note 55, at 4. 
 57. Brief in Support of Entry of Order for Rehabilitation at 3–4, In re The Rehab. of 
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar. 
24, 2010) [hereinafter Rehab. Brief]. 
 58. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 4240 (McKinney 2005). 
 59. WIS. STAT. § 611.24(2) (2010). 
 60. Notice and Verified Motion for Approval of Creation of Segregated Account at 2, 6, 8, In 
re The Liquidation of WMBIC Indemnity Corp., No. 85-CV-3361 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Sept. 
21, 1990). 
 61. WIS. STAT. § 611.24(2).  
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surplus and the initial expendable surplus to be provided for each 
segregated account. If a segregated account is established after a 
certificate of authority has been issued, the commissioner shall require the 
corporation to have and maintain an adequate amount of capital and 
surplus in the segregated account.62 
Wisconsin treats the segregated account as an independent insurance 
subsidiary for the purposes of a rehabilitation proceeding under 
Wisconsin’s insolvency statutes. 
(e) Delinquency proceedings. Each segregated account shall be deemed an 
insurer within the meaning of s. 645.03(1)(f). A liquidation order under s. 
645.42 for the general account or for any segregated account shall have 
effect as a rehabilitation order under s. 645.32 for all other accounts of the 
corporation. Claims remaining unpaid after completion of the liquidation 
under ch. 645 shall have liens on the interests of shareholders, if any, in all 
of the corporation’s assets that are not liquidated, and the rehabilitator may 
transform the liens into ownership interests under s. 645.33(5).63 
Ambac announced on March 24, 2010 that it had created a segregated 
account for a large portion of its structured finance business and a small 
part of its municipal business.64 The OCI petitioned for an order of 
rehabilitation for Ambac’s Segregated Account.65 Then, Ambac announced 
that it had contributed all of its business consisting of guarantees of RMBS 
to the Segregated Account.66 It also contributed its exposure to a failing 
infrastructure project (i.e., the Las Vegas Monorail), certain student loan 
securitizations, and all CDS creditors that had not agreed to commute their 
exposure.67 Ambac also allocated certain liabilities, such as Ambac 
Assurance’s exposure on the lease of its New York headquarters.68 
Additionally, Ambac contributed two assets to its Segregated Account. 
The first was a $2 billion note secured by the premium flows attributable to 
the business lines transferred to the Segregated Account.69 The second was 
an excess of loss reinsurance agreement that obligated the remainder of 
Ambac (the General Account) to pay the Segregated Account’s losses 
above the $2 billion.70 Under neither instrument, however, would the 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. § 611.24(3)(a).  
 63. Id. § 611.24(3)(e).  
 64. Rehab. Brief, supra note 57, at 3–4. 
 65. Id. at 4.  
 66. Id. at 3. 
 67. Verified Petition for Order of Rehabilitation, Tab 1 at 2, In re The Rehab. of Segregated 
Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar. 24, 2010) 
[hereinafter Rehab. Petition].  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. Tab 1 at 3.  
 70. Id.  
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General Account be required to make payments if its surplus declined 
below $100 million.71 
In addition to granting the OCI’s rehabilitation petition, Wisconsin’s 
Dane County Circuit Court in Darlington, Wisconsin (the Rehabilitation 
Court) issued an injunction.72 This injunction prohibited parties from taking 
any action against the Segregated Account, the General Account in respect 
of the Segregated Account, or the Commissioner.73 In addition, the 
injunction barred any parties from exercising setoff and from exercising 
rights under their documents that the Segregated Account would have had if 
it were not in default.74 
In early June 2010, Ambac concluded its commutation arrangement 
with the CDS creditors that remained in the General Account. It agreed to 
pay fourteen financial institutions that were counterparties on its CDS 
transactions (the CDS Banks) $2.6 billion in cash and $2 billion in surplus 
notes in exchange for a release from these liabilities.75 Ambac also granted 
the commuting creditors certain releases, the terms of which were never 
made public.76 The surplus notes have a stated maturity in 2020 and bear a 
coupon rate of 5.1 percent. In an apparent indication of the valuation of the 
surplus notes, some of the counterparties entered into call options with 
Ambac under which Ambac could purchase $940 million of their surplus 
notes for a weighted-average call price of $0.22 for each dollar of face 
amount. Ambac and the CDS Banks hired BlackRock Solutions 
(BlackRock) to evaluate the CDS exposure. BlackRock determined that the 
present value of CDS exposure to the CDS Banks on a base case was $7.7 
billion (or $9.2 billion on a stress case).77 The OCI calculated that the banks 
received 43.3 percent of their expected losses—24.5 percent in cash and 
18.8 percent in notes—and warned that the banks were entitled to $12.9 
billion if they were able to terminate their swaps and demand a mark-to-
market payment. 78 The OCI’s calculation was incorrect as they paid the 
CDS Banks $2.6 billion in cash with a present value of $2.6 billion for $7.7 
billion of present value claims79 or approximately 34 percent of their claims 
plus the notes. Meanwhile, Ambac, on its statutory books, carried only $4.3 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. Tab 1 at 3–4.  
 72. See generally Order for Temporary Injunctive Relief, In re The Rehab. of Segregated 
Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar. 24, 2010) 
[hereinafter Temporary Injunction]. 
 73. Id. at 2. The injunction prohibiting actions against the Commissioner is unqualified in 
every respect. The Commissioner may not be sued by anyone. Id. at 2–3.  
 74. Id. at 4–5. This was a truly remarkable result given that the claimants against the trusts that 
issued the securities were not before the Rehabilitation Court. 
 75. Disclosure Statement, supra note 32, at 21–22. 
 76. Ambac 2009 10-K, supra note 55, at 6; Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 
118–19 (Mar. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Ambac 2010 10-K]. 
 77. Disclosure Statement, supra note 32, at 21. 
 78. Id. at 22.  
 79. Id. at 21.  
2011] The New World Order 147 
billion in impairment losses on subsidiary guarantees, not all of which was 
for exposure to the CDS Banks.80 On this basis, the banks actually received 
more than the carrying value of their claims.81 
Multiple parties objected to the rehabilitation, and the Segregated 
Account and the CDS Banks settlement. The Rehabilitation Court listened 
to the objections and overruled each of them. The first came from the 
indenture trustee of the Las Vegas Monorail bonds on April 5, 2010.82 
Subsequent objections were made by holders of the Las Vegas Monorail 
bonds and by a group of investors holding RMBS and other Ambac-
guaranteed exposures. The objections fall into a number of categories. 
First, the RMBS holders objected to the formation of the Segregated 
Account, claiming that it could not meet the standard articulated in 
Wisconsin Statute section 611.24(3) of “adequate capital and surplus” 
because it could not pay holders in cash and it was placed into rehabilitation 
as soon as it was formed.83 They also argued that the formation was an 
improper novation of their policies.84 They asserted that the formation of 
the Segregated Account was a taking of private property for public use 
without compensation under the Fifth Amendment and a denial of due 
process for failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
taking their rights through the rehabilitation petition.85 The Rehabilitation 
Court heard these objections on May 25, 2010 and denied them on May 27, 
2010.86 The RMBS holders’ appeal is currently pending before the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals.87  
The RMBS investors, Freddie Mac (holder of substantial investments 
backed by Ambac guaranties) and the Las Vegas Monorail holders, each 
argued that the Wisconsin court was wrong to approve the CDS Bank 
settlement without a full review. These objections were heard on May 25, 
2010 and denied on May 27, 2010.88 The Rehabilitation Court adopted the 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 114 (May 17, 2010).  
 81. Given that $4.3 billion is less than $4.6 billion. 
 82. See Brief by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in its Capacity as Trustee for the Benefit and 
Protection of Certain Bondholders, in Support of Its Motion to Modify Temporary Injunction 
Order and to Intervene at Ex. A, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance 
Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Apr. 5, 2010). 
 83. See, e.g., Brief in Support of Motion and Emergency Motion to Modify Order for 
Temporary Injunctive Relief Filed by Certain RMBS Policyholders and Motion Seeking 
Expedited Relief at 24–25, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., 
No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Apr. 30, 2010). 
 84. Id. at 23–24. 
 85. Id. at 23–28.  
 86. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Motions of Certain RMBS 
Policyholders and Certain LVM Bondholders at 1, 14–17, In re The Rehab. of Segregated 
Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. May 27, 2010) 
[hereinafter May 27th Order]. 
 87. Notice of Appeal, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., 
No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. May 28, 2010). 
 88. May 27th Order, supra note 86, at 14–17. 
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OCI’s argument that the holders would not suffer irreparable harm if the 
settlement were concluded.89 The OCI then argued to the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals that any challenge to the settlement should be dismissed as 
moot.90 This resulted in a sharp rebuke from the appellate court and the 
grant of permission for the holders to proceed with the appeal.91 
Several policyholders, beneficiaries, creditors, and trustees objected to 
their inclusion in the Segregated Account. These objections were also 
denied.92 
The OCI proposed a Rehabilitation Plan for the Segregated Account of 
Ambac Assurance (the Plan) on October 8, 2010.93 The Plan proposed to 
continue the injunction and begin a claim adjudication procedure that would 
pay the claims against the Segregated Account 25 percent in cash and 75 
percent in surplus notes to be issued by the Segregated Account and to be 
pari passu with the surplus notes issued to the CDS Banks by the General 
Account.94 
Ambac’s fate took a turn when its parent, Ambac Financial, filed for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 on November 8, 2010.95 The holding 
company could not obtain funding from the insurance subsidiaries. As a 
result, it had $136 million in cash and investments at the end of 2009 to 
support $1.6 billion in long-term debt.96 At the time of the filing, the 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Order, Dilweg v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 2010AP1291 (Wis. App. June 18, 2010). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Order Denying Motions of Wells Fargo Bank and Certain LVM Bondholders and 
Emergency Motions to Postpone the July 9, 2010 Hearing on the Motions of Wells Fargo Bank 
and Certain LVM Bondholders at 8, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance 
Corp., No. 10-CV-576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. July 16, 2010); see also May 27th Order, supra 
note 86, at 14–17; Decision on Motions Challenging the Legality of the Establishment and 
Structure of The Segregated Account, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac 
Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 26, 2010); Challenges to the 
Temporary Injunction Concerning the Exercise of Control Rights, Withholding of Premiums and 
Other Objections, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-
CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 26, 2010); Motions to Formally Intervene as Parties to 
this Rehabilitation Action, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., 
No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 26, 2010). 
 93. See Plan of Rehabilitation, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance 
Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 8, 2010).  
 94. Disclosure Statement, supra note 32, at 21. Hearings on the Plan were held by the 
Rehabilitation Court in Darlington, over objections to the forum and requests for better facilities in 
a metropolitan area. The judge went so far as to tell counsel for some of the student loan lenders to 
check into the Super 8 in Darlington when he could not find a room and later humorously offered 
to help him find a place to stay. Transcript of Hearing at 39–40, 88, In re The Rehab. of 
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 
14, 2010).  
 95. Voluntary Petition, In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10-15973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 
2010). 
 96. Ambac 2009 10-K, supra note 55, at 214. 
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bankruptcy schedules showed only $63 million in cash and another $22 
million in securities.97 
In late 2009, nearly a year before Ambac Financial filed for bankruptcy, 
Ambac took a tax refund, which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is 
seeking to recapture. After Ambac Financial went into bankruptcy, the IRS 
could have sought recovery from Ambac’s General Account because all 
members of a consolidated tax group are jointly and severally liable for 
taxes.98 Anticipating IRS collection, the OCI went to the Rehabilitation 
Court on the eve of Ambac Financial’s bankruptcy petition to gain an 
injunction against the IRS to prevent it from collecting taxes from the 
General Account or the Segregated Account.99 The OCI also amended the 
Plan for the Segregated Account to allocate the IRS’s claim to the 
Segregated Account.100 
The IRS attempted to remove the proceedings to the Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin where it sought to have the 
injunction dissolved.101 The IRS made the somewhat revolutionary claim 
that laws for the collection of tax, unlike many federal statutes, such as the 
Bankruptcy Code, need not be reverse preempted by the Wisconsin 
insurance receivership statutes.102 Although McCarran-Ferguson shields 
some parts of state receivership laws from preemption by federal statutes,103 
the IRS argued that McCarran-Ferguson was passed pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause, and thus, did not preempt tax statutes passed pursuant to 
the Taxation Clause.104 The federal court, however, sided with the 
Commissioner and remanded the case to the state court based upon its 
interpretation of McCarran-Ferguson.105 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Schedule of Assets and Liabilities for Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (Schedule B), In re 
Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10-15973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010). 
 98. Complaint at 14, Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. v. United States (In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc.), 
Adv. Pro. No. 10-04210 (Nov. 9, 2010). 
 99. Order for Temporary Supplemental Injunctive Relief at 1–2, In re The Rehab. of 
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Nov. 
8, 2010). 
 100. Notice of Amendment to Plan of Operation for the Segregated Account, In re The Rehab. 
of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. 
Nov. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Notice of Amendment to Plan]. 
 101. See generally Notice of Removal to the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Wisconsin, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 
10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Dec. 8, 2010); Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dissolve Order for Temporary Supplemental Injunctive Relief and Objections to Notice, Motion 
and Order at 2, Dilweg v. United States, No. 10-CV-778 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 17, 2010). 
 102. See United States’ Opposition to Motion to Remand at 7–8, Dilweg, No. 10-CV-778 (W.D. 
Wis. Dec. 30, 2010) [hereinafter IRS Remand Brief]. 
 103. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500 (1993). 
 104. IRS Remand Brief, supra note 102, at 7.  
 105. Order and Opinion at 2, Nickel v. United States (In re The Rehab. of the Segregated 
Account of Ambac Assurance Corp.), No. 10-CV-778 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Jan. 
14 Order]. 
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After the Seventh Circuit signaled it would reject its appeal of the 
remand order,106 the IRS tried again—this time as a direct suit against the 
court to stay the injunction.107 The district court turned the IRS away 
again.108 As of this writing, briefing on the appeals in the Seventh Circuit is 
largely completed, but no decision has been reached. Meanwhile, on 
remand, the Wisconsin court promptly confirmed the Plan.109 The IRS 
appealed the confirmation.110 The OCI, however, persuaded the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals that the IRS’s appeal should be dismissed because the 
attorney signing it was not admitted in Wisconsin.111 The IRS has appealed 
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and briefing is underway in the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals on the various other objections to confirmation of the 
Plan.112 
IV. CHANGES TO INSURANCE INSOLVENCY PRINCIPLES 
The proceedings in relation to Ambac’s distress are interesting to the 
insurance insolvency professional because they test four key insolvency 
principles: (1) the priority of claims in an insurance company insolvency, 
(2) the role of the best interests of creditors test in insurance rehabilitations, 
(3) the ability of an insurance company to divide its liabilities, and (4) the 
robustness of McCarran-Ferguson’s reverse preemption of federal statutes. 
This paper will address each of these four issues in turn. 
A. PRIORITY 
Insurance receiverships have existed longer than the Bankruptcy Code 
or its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The priority of claims in an 
insurance receivership is governed by state priority statutes.113 As the 
Supreme Court recounted in U.S. Department of the Treasury v. Fabe, the 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Order, Nickel v. United States, No. 11-1158 (7th Cir. Jan. 20, 2011) (making a preliminary 
finding that the district court’s order to remand the matter to the state court is not reviewable). 
 107. Memorandum of Law in Support of United States’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 
for Expedited Ruling by February 17, 2011, United States v. Wis. State Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
767 F. Supp. 2d 980 (W.D. Wis. 2011) (No. 11-CV-99). 
 108. United States v. Wis. State Ct. for Dane Cnty., 767 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981 (W.D. Wis. 
2011). 
 109. Decision and Final Order Confirming the Rehabilitator’s Plan of Rehabilitation with 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac 
Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Jan. 24, 2011). 
 110. Notice of Appeal at 1, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance 
Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Mar. 8, 2011). 
 111. Order at 10, Dilweg v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nos. 2010AP1291, 2010AP2022, 2010AP2835, 
2010AP300, 2010AP561 (Wis. Ct. App. May 3, 2011). 
 112. See generally Reply Brief for United States of America Interested Party-Appellant-
Petitioner, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., App. No. 
2011AP987 (Wis. Nov. 3, 2011); Appellants’ Consolidated Reply Brief, App. No. 2011 AP 561 
(Wis. App. Aug. 29, 2011). 
 113. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7434–7435 (McKinney 2005) (governing property casualty 
companies and life insurance companies). 
2011] The New World Order 151 
costs of administering the estate come first, and policyholders generally 
come second. Thanks to Fabe’s conclusion that the Federal Priority Statute, 
31 U.S.C. § 3713(a), was preempted by state statute, the federal 
government comes after policyholders, and all other creditors follow.114 
Those holding claims under reinsurance policies are treated as general 
creditors, not policyholders, whether the statutes say so,115 or not.116 
The question most often asked when contemplating the insolvency of a 
financial guaranty company is: what is the relative priority of CDS 
counterparties and those holding guaranties of municipal bonds? Although 
discussed in some of the Ambac pleadings,117 this issue has never been fully 
litigated. It can be argued that those policyholders holding direct guarantees 
of municipal bonds have priority over CDS counterparties because: (1) the 
“policies” issued to guaranty CDS payments are simply subsidiary 
guarantees (i.e., the insurance company is merely guaranteeing the 
performance of its non-insurance subsidiary that entered into the swap);118 
(2) CDSs are not part of the business of insurance119 and therefore are not 
entitled to protection from the Federal Priority Statute that places the 
federal government first in any non-bankruptcy insolvency;120 (3) holders of 
CDSs lack an insurable interest because most do not hold the underlying 
obligations against which they have purchased CDS protection, and 
therefore, CDSs are not insurance policies at all;121 and (4) CDSs are akin to 
                                                                                                                 
 114. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 508–09 (1993). 
 115. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 7434; CAL. INS. CODE. § 1033(d)(3) (West 2000). 
 116. See, e.g., 40 P.A. STAT. ANN. § 221.44 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3903.42 
(West 2005); see also Covington v. Ohio Gen. Ins. Co., 99 Ohio St. 3d 117, 2003-Ohio-2720, 789 
N.E.2d 213, at ¶ 3 (discussing reinsurance creditors). 
 117. See, e.g., Brief in Support of Emergency Motion to Enjoin Consummation of the Proposed 
Settlement between Ambac and Certain CDS Counterparties at 14–17, In re The Rehab. of 
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. May 
5, 2011). The circuit court’s decision in the matter was based almost entirely on deference to the 
regulator. See May 27th Order, supra note 86, at 14–17. 
 118. If we consider an ordinary corporation that guarantees the performance of a subsidiary—
for example, to obtain credit to purchase goods—an observer would not likely say that such an 
exchange is insurance, would they? 
 119. The CDS industry agrees that CDSs are not insurance:  
CDSs are not insurance for numerous reasons. Most significantly, there is no 
requirement that the protection buyer own the asset on which it is buying protection or 
that it suffer any loss. Other common features of CDSs that distinguish them from 
insurance include: (i) the absence of a requirement that the buyer provide proof of loss 
as a condition to payment; (ii) payment upon settlement that may be more than the loss 
(if any) suffered by the buyer; (iii) the absence of rights of subrogation; and (iv) 
differences in accounting, tax, bankruptcy and other regulatory treatment. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 7 n.2, Aon Fin. Prod. v. 
Société Générale, No. 06-1080-CV (2d Cir. May 8, 2006) (citation omitted). 
 120. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 492 (1993). 
 121. See Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. Chase, 72 U.S. 509, 512–13 (1866) (“The assured must 
therefore have an interest in the property insured; otherwise, there is a temptation to destroy it, 
which sound policy condemns.”). 
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reinsurance because they simply assume a risk voluntarily assumed by 
another entity.122  
It can also be argued that mark-to-market damages upon swap 
termination are “penalties or forfeitures” which, under Wisconsin’s priority 
statute, are allowed as general creditors “only to the extent of the pecuniary 
loss sustained from the act, transaction or proceeding out of which the 
penalty or forfeiture arose,” with the rest being subordinated to the most 
junior class.123 Proponents of equal priority for CDS counterparty claimants 
frequently say that the CDS policyholders have an interest in the financial 
performance of the subsidiary, and therefore, have an insurable interest.124 
Proponents of CDS interests may also argue that under the Wisconsin 
priority statute, surety bonds have policyholder priority, and that these 
policies are a form of municipal bond guaranty which constitute surety 
insurance under Wisconsin regulations.125 CDS counterparties also argue 
that their losses are not “penalties” or “forfeitures” because those terms 
refer to punishments by government authorities.126 
In Ambac, one can easily argue that the CDS counterparties, who got 
out with cash long before anyone else did and received a third of their 
probable claims in cash, actually enjoyed priority over the RMBS creditors 
who will receive 25 percent in cash and the rest in the surplus notes, the 
payment of which is quite uncertain (remembering the call options granted 
by the banks at approximately 22 percent of face value).127 The CDS Banks 
could also enjoy priority over the municipal holders who are at the mercy of 
Ambac paying out all but $100 million of the General Account’s surplus to 
cover RMBS losses, leaving the General Account exposed to a major 
municipal failure.128 The CDS counterparties arguably did as well or better 
than the other two groups, and they certainly were paid sooner. 
B. THE BEST INTERESTS OF CREDITORS TEST 
It has long been a part of the confirmation of a bankruptcy plan of 
reorganization under Chapter 11 that a dissenting creditor must receive as 
much as he would in a liquidation.129 This is commonly called the “best 
interests of creditors test.” It has been handed down in insurance insolvency 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Actually, the risk is transferred twice. First, someone buys a bond, and they assume the 
risk of default. They then place that risk with the subsidiary of a financial guaranty company, and 
then the financial guaranty company guarantees the risk of its subsidiary’s nonpayment. See supra 
text accompanying note 38. 
 123. WIS. STAT. § 645.68 (5) (2009–2010). 
 124. See Bank of Insureds’ Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 9–11. 
 125. WIS. STAT. § 645.03(2); WIS. ADM. CODE INS. § 3.08(1). 
 126. Bank of Insureds’ Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 11–12. 
 127. Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., Report of Unscheduled Events or Corporate Changes (Form 8-K) 2 
(Oct. 12, 2010). 
 128. Rehab. Petition, supra note 67, Tab 1 at 3–4.  
 129. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2006). 
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from two celebrated insurance rehabilitations: the Pacific Mutual Insurance 
Company insolvency in the 1940s in California and the National Surety 
Company insolvency in the 1930s in New York.130 
In these two cases, a distressed insurer was divided up into separate 
units in order to save the successful business and liquidate the business that 
caused the impairment.131 In National Surety, the rehabilitation plan 
contemplated three companies: one for “selected lines of preferred risks,” a 
second for “obligations under mortgage guaranties,” and a third to liquidate 
the remaining assets.132 In Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company of California, life policyholders would be transferred to a new 
company and paid as before, but non-cancellable disability policyholders 
would receive from 20–90 percent of their claims depending on the year of 
issue.133 The non-consenting holders would be left in the old company 
which would be liquidated.134 In each case, the lines of business that 
brought about the insolvency were treated less favorably than those that did 
not. 
Both courts emphasized the need for a creative rehabilitation. The 
National Surety court stated that “numerous other creditors and those 
dealing with the National Surety Company will most likely be saved 
millions of dollars by the method of rehabilitation proposed by the 
superintendent of insurance.”135 The Carpenter court stated that “[t]he 
public has a grave and important interest in preserving the business if that is 
possible.”136 The court continued, “Liquidation is the last resort.”137 
In order to reach these goals, the California Supreme Court found that 
disparate treatment was appropriate: 
Moreover, the record demonstrates that under the circumstances here 
existing the difference in treatment was justified. The life policyholders, 
and the commercial health and accident policyholders were paying 
adequate premiums for their insurance and these phases of the old 
company’s business were highly profitable. The [non-cancellable] 
policyholders were not paying adequate premiums, and this fact was the 
primary cause of the difficulties of the old company. The [non-
cancellable] policies were draining the old company to disaster. If any 
plan of rehabilitation was to succeed it was imperative that the integrity of 
the life business be preserved in order to earn profits for the benefit of all 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Carpenter v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 74 P.2d 761, 778 (Cal. 1938), aff’d sub nom., 
Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938); Matter of People of the State of N.Y., by Van Schaick 
(In re Nat’l Sur. Co.), 268 N.Y.S. 88, 91 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t. 1933), aff’d, 191 N.E. 521 (N.Y. 
1934). 
 131. Carpenter, 74 P.2d at 771–72; In re Nat’l Sur. Co., 268 N.Y.S. at 91. 
 132. In re Nat’l Sur. Co., 268 N.Y.S. at 91. 
 133. Carpenter, 74 P.2d at 768. 
 134. Id.  
 135. In re Nat’l Sur. Co., 268 N.Y.S. at 96. 
 136. Carpenter, 74 P.2d at 775. 
 137. Id.  
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concerned, including the [non-cancellable] policyholders. Continued 
profits from the life business, and from the profitable accident and health 
business, furnished the only sources from which full contract benefits to 
[non-cancellable] policyholders could ever be resumed.138 
The court concluded, however, that the dissenting holders would not be 
inappropriately disadvantaged as long as they received at least what they 
would have received in liquidation: “All the dissenter is entitled to is the 
equivalent of what he would receive on liquidation.”139 
The Supreme Court, in affirming Carpenter, factored in the right to 
receive breach damages, and found that constitutional rights had not been 
abridged: 
The petitioners have no constitutional right to a particular form of remedy. 
They are not entitled, as against their fellows who prefer to come under 
the plan and accept its benefits, to force, at their own wish or whim, a 
liquidation which under the findings will not advantage them and may 
seriously injure those who accept the benefit of the plan. They are not 
bound, as were the dissenting creditors in Doty v. Love . . . , to accept the 
obligation of the new company but are afforded an alternative whereby 
they will receive damages for breach of their contracts. They have failed 
to show that the plan takes their property without due process.140 
It is important to note that in Doty, the bank under consideration had 
been in liquidation proceedings for two years. Justice Cardozo, in writing 
for the court, makes it clear that the creditors were better off in 
rehabilitation, than they would have been had the bank been liquidated.141 
In the case of Ambac, the Commissioner expressly rejected the best 
interests of creditors test, concluding that “nothing in Carpenter suggests 
that it is a necessary component of all rehabilitation plans; indeed, by 
providing an alternative justification for the plan’s differing treatment of a 
certain subset of policyholders, it suggests the opposite.”142 
In Ambac, the application of the best interests of creditors test is 
complex. The CDS holders were paid out right away. If they are found to be 
junior to other creditors, then the RMBS holders received a poor deal. If the 
CDS holders are found to be equal to the other creditors, then the RMBS 
and municipal holders could argue that the CDS holders received much 
better treatment since they received money right away, while the other two 
groups had to take the risks of a long payout and possibly huge claims. If 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id. at 778.  
 139. Id.  
 140. See Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297, 305 (1938) (footnote omitted) (citing Doty v. 
Love, 295 U.S. 64 (1935)). 
 141. See Doty, 295 U.S. at 70–74. 
 142. Rehabilitator’s Brief in Support of Motion for Confirmation of the Plan of Rehabilitation 
at 14 n.3, In re The Rehab. of Segregated Account Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 10-CV-1576 
(Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane Cnty. Oct. 21, 2010) (citing Carpenter, 74 P.2d at 778–79).  
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claims on both of these groups turn out to be modest and all claimants are 
paid in full, then no complaint could be had, but it will be a long ride until 
we know the truth. If, on the other hand, creditors are not paid in full, it is 
entirely possible that the RMBS holders will receive less than the CDS 
counterparties did and will receive it much further into the future. If the 
surplus notes turn out to be worthless, the RMBS holders will have received 
25 percent of their claims when they come due, while the CDS 
counterparties received a third or more of their claims at the start of the 
case. 
Unlike the parties in Carpenter, none of the creditors here were offered 
a liquidation value alternative.143 Unlike Doty, Ambac has not yet been 
involved in a liquidation proceeding.144 While, like National Surety, Ambac 
placed assets in defined pools, granting creditors recourse to those defined 
pools, Ambac lacks the judicial findings that are emphasized by Justice 
Cardozo in Doty.145 Cardozo emphasized, “The judicial power has not been 
delegated to nonjudicial agencies or to persons or factions interested in the 
event.”146 The safeguard of the best interests of creditors test is absent from 
the Ambac proceedings. 
C. TRANSFERRING LIABILITIES 
Transferring the policy liabilities of an insurance company to another 
entity is not a widely accepted practice in the United States, but it is in the 
United Kingdom under Part VII of the U.K. Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 (Part VII).147 
Part VII provides “for the transfer to the transferee of the whole or any 
part of the undertaking concerned and of any property or liabilities of the 
authorised person concerned.”148 Insurance business transfers are permitted 
under section 105.149 In connection with a Part VII transfer, the liabilities of 
the transferor are transferred to a transferee, and the transferor is released 
from any further liability.150 Thus, if the transferee subsequently fails, the 
creditors have no recourse to their original contractual obligor.151 
Part VII provides for judicial review and approval of the proposed 
transfer after an administrative review by the U.K. market regulator, the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA).152 The FSA engages an actuarial 
                                                                                                                 
 143. See Neblett, 305 U.S. at 305. 
 144. See Doty, 295 U.S. at 65.  
 145. Id. at 71; see generally May 27th Order, supra note 86. 
 146. Doty, 295 U.S. at 71. 
 147. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 107 (U.K.). 
 148. Id. § 112(1)(a). 
 149. Id. § 105. 
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expert, paid by the transferor, who reviews the proposed transaction to 
determine whether the transferee will have the financial ability to pay the 
liabilities transferred.153 If the report is positive and the FSA is otherwise 
satisfied with the proposed transfer, the transferor commences legal 
proceedings for sanctioning under Part VII.154 Creditors whose claims are 
being transferred are entitled to receive notice of the proceeding. Unlike 
their distant cousin, schemes of arrangement, creditors are not entitled to 
vote, and their basis for objection is extremely limited. In addition, it 
appears that in practice, creditors have little or no right to receive 
information concerning the details behind an expert’s analysis.155 
A Part VII transfer differs meaningfully from U.S. law, in that U.S. law 
does not permit a corporation to channel liabilities to particular assets in the 
absence of insolvency proceedings.156 While a corporation could 
theoretically accomplish a similar result by rearranging its assets through 
dividends, an insurance company is unlikely to be able to do so as a 
practical matter, due to dividend restrictions and capital requirements. 
Moreover, in a Part VII transfer, there may be no continuity between the 
transferor and the transferee as to management or financial strength.157 
While this result may be theoretically possible in a merger, the degree of 
separation effectuated by a Part VII transfer would be difficult to 
replicate.158 
Opponents of a Part VII transfer will argue that the transfer effectuates 
a novation of a contract without the consent of the creditor. Novations 
without the consent of the parties are barred in most of the United States. 
Under the common law of contracts, an obligor may generally delegate 
performance of his contractual duty to another. However, neither the fact 
that the obligor delegates performance of a contract, nor that fact that a 
person contracts with the obligor to assume the duty, will discharge any 
duty or liability of the original obligor, unless the obligee agrees 
otherwise.159 
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As described below, novations without consent are contrary to the well-
settled law in many states, including the three largest, California, New 
York, and Texas.160 
California law does not permit a novation without the consent of the 
creditor. 
What appellant is really contending for is a novation. The Civil Code, 
section 1530, defines this as the ‘substitution of a new obligation for an 
existing one.’ An essential element of a novation is the agreement of all of 
the parties to the new contract.161 
 In California, this restriction on novation is codified by statute. The 
California Code states in pertinent part, “[t]he burden of an obligation may 
be transferred with the consent of the party entitled to its benefit, but not 
otherwise, except as provided by section 1466,” which governs real estate 
covenants.162 Although there is a special provision for an insurer 
withdrawing entirely from California to transfer policies to another insurer, 
this section “is silent regarding the extent of any continuing liability on the 
part of the withdrawing insurer.”163 A California appellate court ruled, “It 
simply is not within the power of an insurer, against the consent of the 
insured, to substitute another insurer in carrying out of its undertaking.”164 
New York has a long tradition holding a party to its contractual duty 
unless the creditor consents to a novation transaction. 
If the defendant chose to perform its contract through an independent 
contractor, it may have been within its rights. Nevertheless it could not 
thereby escape liability for its nonperformance through the negligence of 
one to whom the contract duty was assigned.165 
Similarly, in Texas, novation is strictly consensual. As a Texas 
appellate court explained,  
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To constitute novation of an original contract, an agreement made 
thereunder must have fully extinguished the same . . . . 
The essential elements of a novation are: (1) a previous, valid 
obligation, (2) an agreement of the parties to a new contract, (3) the 
extinguishment of the old contract and, (4) the validity of the new 
contract.166  
This is also the law in other states.167 
Proponents of a Part VII transfer could potentially argue in response 
that assumption reinsurance transactions effectuate novations without 
creditor consent.168 An assumption reinsurance transaction transfers policies 
and their liabilities to a new insurance company.169 Only seventeen states, 
however, have statutes that authorize these transactions. Most of those 
statutes, as well as the NAIC Assumption Reinsurance Model Act, provide 
that assumption cannot occur unless the policyholder consents or the insurer 
is in a hazardous financial condition.170 
Ambac did not pursue an assumption reinsurance transaction. Ambac 
used the segregated account machinery to put liabilities into another 
separate structure, the Segregated Account.171 Although there are no readily 
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identifiable transactions that affect a transfer of an active book of business 
into an envelope that is unlikely to have the resources to pay those 
liabilities, the use of a separation in Ambac looks very much like a Part VII 
transfer.172 The primary difference is that the Segregated Account has 
access to most of the capital of the General Account through the Secured 
Note and the Excess of Loss Reinsurance Agreement.173 After the General 
Account falls to $100 million in surplus, the Segregated Account creditors 
may no longer look to the General Account for payment.174 
D. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON DILEMMA 
McCarran-Ferguson175 has faced its greatest test to date in the dispute 
between the IRS and the Ambac Rehabilitator. This dispute centers on 
Ambac Financial’s change in its accounting method for CDSs. Prior to 
2005, Ambac Financial filed consolidated returns on behalf of itself and the 
members of its corporate group including Ambac Assurance, recognizing 
any gain or loss at the time a credit derivative position was closed out.176 In 
early 2008, Ambac changed its accounting method to one that recognizes 
gain or loss on a mark-to-market basis.177 Ambac claimed that this 
accounting change was related to its change in the form it used for credit 
derivative transactions from a physical settlement form to a cash settlement 
form in 2005. In 2005 and 2006, however, Ambac filed its returns without 
recognizing any gain or loss on the post-2005 contracts unless the trades 
had been closed out.178 
When Ambac adopted a mark-to-market approach, it recognized a small 
loss in 2008 for the year ending December 31, 2007 and a huge loss in 2009 
for 2008, resulting in over $700 million of tax refunds.179 According to the 
IRS, it had no choice but to give Ambac the refund and analyze it later.180 
Ambac placed its Segregated Account into rehabilitation proceedings on 
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March 24, 2010, less than two months after receiving its last refund of 
approximately $444 million.181 
When the IRS came calling on October 28, 2010, they asked if Ambac 
had received permission from the IRS to change its accounting methods.182 
Ambac Financial responded on November 8, 2010 by filing for bankruptcy 
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.183 The IRS responded 
that members of a group filing a consolidated return are jointly and 
severally liable for tax liabilities, pursuant to 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1502-6, 
1.1502-78.184 This exposed the General Account to the liability to repay the 
disputed refund. 
The day before Ambac Financial’s bankruptcy petition was filed, 
however, the Wisconsin Commissioner in his role as Rehabilitator of 
Ambac’s Segregated Account, amended the Segregated Account’s 
Operating Plan to channel the IRS’s claims to the Segregated Account, 
which was in rehabilitation and subject to a judicial stay.185 The 
Commissioner also persuaded the Rehabilitation Court, ex parte, to enter an 
injunction barring the IRS from collecting against either the General 
Account or Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance.186 This remarkable 
series of events left the refund dispute subject to the rehabilitation 
injunction and the IRS with no way to reclaim the refund, even if the IRS is 
successful in demonstrating that Ambac Financial was not entitled to the 
refund.187 
The IRS responded by filing a notice of removal to send its portion of 
the rehabilitation case to the Federal District Court for the Western District 
of Wisconsin.188 Once in federal court the Commissioner petitioned the 
court to remand the proceeding to state court, and the IRS filed a motion to 
dissolve the state court injunction.189 
In his motion to remand the proceeding to state court, the 
Commissioner argued that the federal court had no jurisdiction to hear the 
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dispute.190 He maintained that the removal to federal court was precluded 
by McCarran-Ferguson.191 
(a) State regulation – The business of insurance, and every person engaged 
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the 
regulation or taxation of such business. 
(b) Federal regulation – No Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or 
tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business 
of insurance[.]192 
The Commissioner insisted that chapter 645 of the Wisconsin statutes 
gives the Rehabilitation Court exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings and 
that it can enforce remedies that protect those proceedings.193 He further 
argued that a grant of jurisdiction to the federal court would “impair and 
supersede” the proceeding under chapter 645,194 which regulates the 
business of insurance.195 Furthermore, the segregated account statute 
allowed him to assign the IRS’s claims to the Segregated Account.196 The 
Commissioner claimed that the federal jurisdiction statues do not 
specifically relate to the business of insurance,197 and that the IRS’s rights 
could be preserved in state court.198 
In addition, the Commissioner encouraged the federal court to abstain 
from exercising its jurisdiction because any federal action would interfere 
with a state regulatory scheme.199 The Commissioner correctly referred to 
many cases in which federal courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction 
over the matter.200 
The IRS responded with the following arguments. First, McCarran-
Ferguson does not apply to the federal government’s powers to tax. It 
maintained that the U.S. Constitution’s Taxation Clause, prevents the states 
from restraining that power.201 Second, the IRS argued that the Anti-
Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), prevents state courts from issuing 
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injunctions that interfere with federal taxation.202 Third, Ambac took 
advantage of the ability to file a consolidated return and must therefore 
abide by the rules regarding returns.203 Fourth, the IRS’s ability to recapture 
tentative refunds is an important part of the taxing power.204 The IRS 
insisted that McCarran-Ferguson could not abridge the taxing power 
because the Act was enacted under Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, 
not its taxing powers, 205 an argument developed in a law journal article.206 
Fifth, as a question of federal power, the IRS claimed it had the right to 
remove the action to federal court.207 They argued that nothing should 
restrict a federal government agency from having a question of its powers 
reviewed by a federal court.208 Sixth, the IRS maintained that the state court 
does not have jurisdiction over parts of Ambac other than the Segregated 
Account,209 and therefore, could not have jurisdiction over the IRS’s tax 
claims against the General Account. Seventh, the IRS argued against a 
Burford abstention,210 claiming that federal courts should decide questions 
of the government’s constitutional prerogatives.211 Eighth, they disputed the 
Rehabilitation Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, maintaining that rehabilitation 
can continue in federal court, pursuant to Wisconsin Statute section 645.45 
and Wisconsin Statute section 645.82(4).212 The IRS encouraged the federal 
court to look beyond the company’s status as an insurance company and 
acknowledge that the fundamental nature of the action related to the power 
to tax, as the IRS believed.213 
The Commissioner replied that the IRS had “misunderst[ood] 
Wisconsin law and the relationship between the [General and] Segregated 
Accounts.”214 The Commissioner claimed that the IRS just wanted to seize 
$700 million “in violation” of McCarran-Ferguson;215 and that there was a 
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“legal nexus” between the General and Segregated Account because they 
were one entity prior to the rehabilitation petition, and because the General 
Account provides the funding for the Segregated Account.216 The 
Commissioner maintained that no constitutional issue was present; and that 
the dispute was a conflict between a federal law passed by Congress and a 
Wisconsin state law.217 The Commissioner reasoned that since the language 
of McCarran-Ferguson begins with, “No Act of Congress shall be 
construed,” and tax legislation is enacted by Congress, the tax collection 
legislation must yield to state law. 218 
The IRS also petitioned the federal court to dissolve the state court 
injunction that prevented it from collecting from the General Account.219 
The IRS claimed that the General Account exists outside the insurance 
regulatory framework and McCarran-Ferguson. First, it claimed that the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) specifically relates to the business of 
insurance because the IRC imposes tax on insurance companies.220 It 
posited that when Congress legislates in the area of insurance, the 
McCarran-Ferguson preemption is eviscerated.221 The IRS also argued that 
the revised injunction was a violation of the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7421.222 The IRS contended that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits any 
court from taking subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order restraining the 
IRS from collecting taxes. It claimed that the IRC establishes “exclusive 
federal jurisdiction.”223 The IRS also questioned the use of the Wisconsin 
segregated account statute to justify the allocation of tax liability as a part 
of the insurance company’s “business.”224 
The Commissioner’s response to the IRS’s motion stayed close to his 
McCarran-Ferguson arguments, saying that “this is not a tax case; it is an 
insurance case.”225 The Commissioner claimed that the IRS was trying to 
subvert the Fabe holding, which prioritizes policyholder’s claims over the 
federal government’s claims.226 He argued that the Wisconsin priority 
statute227 regulates the business of insurance along with the rest of chapter 
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645. The Commissioner distinguished the statutes taxing insurance228 from 
the tax collection statutes,229 arguing that the latter are not specifically 
targeted at insurance.230 The Commissioner challenged the IRS’s assertion 
that the Wisconsin injunction statute does not regulate the business of 
insurance by pointing out that it is part of chapter 645 and specifically 
references insurance liquidation proceedings.231 He alleged the third prong 
of the McCarran-Ferguson analysis by saying that the IRS attempts to take 
$700 million in “claims-paying resources” would impair the rehabilitation 
proceeding.232 He also claimed that the Anti-Injunction Act is reverse 
preempted by McCarran-Ferguson because it does not specifically relate to 
insurance.233 
When Federal District Court Judge Crabb for the Western District of 
Wisconsin rendered her decision, she declined to address the injunction 
motions, deciding only that McCarran-Ferguson divested the court of 
jurisdiction.234 The judge agreed with the Commissioner that the powers to 
tax “belong to the Congress; the IRS derives its authority from 
Congress.”235 The court found that the Commissioner was not challenging 
the power to tax, but only that McCarran-Ferguson requires the United 
States to conform to state laws.236 Judge Crabb found that chapter 645 
regulates the business of insurance, and that the application of the removal 
statute would disrupt chapter 645’s “comprehensive rehabilitation 
structure” and, therefore, “invalidate[], impair[], or supersede[]” Wisconsin 
law.237 As a result, federal tax laws are not exempt from McCarran-
Ferguson. She adopted the Commissioner’s argument that the rehabilitation 
proceeding extends to the General Account to the extent it is a lender or 
insurer of the Segregated Account. She stated that the Segregated Account 
is not a separate corporation, concluding that “the whole point of the 
rehabilitation is to rehabilitate Ambac Assurance Corporation.”238 In 
addition, she elected to abstain under Burford because “Wisconsin has a 
great interest in maintaining a uniform insurance rehabilitation process that 
provides strong protection to policyholders.”239 Judge Crabb added that 
“[f]ederal court review of the United States’ claims would be disruptive of 
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the state’s rehabilitation goals and procedures.”240 She concluded that the 
injunction is like a bankruptcy stay for insurance companies and that the 
state rehabilitation court is “uniquely qualified to hear these claims.”241 
Once the remand order was submitted, the Rehabilitation Court wasted 
no time in confirming the Plan.242 The IRS attempted to appeal the remand 
order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, but the Seventh 
Circuit was quick to point out that its own rules prohibit the appeal of a 
remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, saying: 243 
This court has consistently reminded litigants that an order remanding 
a case to state court based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a 
defect in the removal procedure is not reviewable on appeal, whether or 
not the decision is correct.244 
The IRS filed a jurisdictional memorandum, claiming that this case 
“implicates significant issues of federal statutory interpretation, federalism, 
and the sovereign prerogatives of the United States.”245 The IRS maintained 
that the remand was beyond the district court’s authority because of the 
unique federal issues.246 The Commissioner argued that this was nonsense; 
this appeal is a review of a federal court finding that it had no subject matter 
jurisdiction.247 
The IRS was not content to sit still with the remand ruling and sued in 
federal court to enjoin the state court from enforcing the November 8, 2010 
injunction, to enjoin the enforcement of the confirmation of the Plan, and to 
void the November 8, 2010 injunction in so far as it affects the IRS.248 The 
parties made similar arguments to those made in the previous federal court 
proceeding. Judge Crabb was no more receptive to these arguments than 
she had been previously. She dismissed the IRS’s complaint within ten days 
of its filing, explaining that even though the posture had changed from a 
removal to a claim for injunctive relief, “this distinction does not change 
my earlier conclusions regarding jurisdiction.”249 The IRS has appealed to 
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the Seventh Circuit—this time hoping that it will not run aground on the 
Seventh Circuit’s rules concerning appeals of remand orders. As of this 
writing, briefing on the appeals in the Seventh Circuit is largely completed, 
but no decision has been reached. . 
The IRS returned to the state court, where it filed an appeal of the 
confirmation of the Plan to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.250 
Unfortunately for the IRS, the attorney who signed the notice of appeal was 
not admitted in Wisconsin, and the Commissioner moved to dismiss its 
appeal.251 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals granted the Commissioner’s 
motion and dismissed the IRS’s appeal on May 3, 2011.252 The IRS has 
petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review.253 
If the Seventh Circuit turns the IRS away, this will have been a great 
victory for McCarran-Ferguson. Ambac was able to draw an enormous 
refund from the federal government on only its say-so. The federal 
government, having provided the refund, must wait in line to get it back 
after policyholders have been paid, with considerable doubt as to whether 
the government will be paid at all. In the process, the Commissioner will 
have successfully argued that the Rehabilitation Court had enough 
jurisdiction over the General Account to stop the IRS, but not enough 
jurisdiction over the General Account to stop the settlement with the CDS 
Banks.254 The rehabilitator and Ambac Financial, along with various other 
parties, have reached a settlement resulting in a new Plan of Reorganization 
for Ambac Financial.255 This settlement involves, among other things, the 
payment by Ambac Assurance to Ambac Financial for the use of net 
operating losses.256 Nevertheless, if the parties cannot settle with the IRS, 
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nothing will be accomplished.257 While Ambac Financial has made a 
proposal to the Department of Justice to settle its disputes with the IRS, at 
the time of this writing, no settlement had been reached.258 The proposed 
settlement includes, among other things, a payment by Ambac Assurance to 
the IRS of $100 million.259  
This drama is by no means over. The Commissioner is now grappling 
with two new threats. First, Ambac Financial, in its public filings, has 
raised the specter that the issuance of the surplus notes by the Segregated 
Account might cause the deconsolidation for tax purposes of the various 
Ambac entities, or, second, the surplus notes may be deemed equity, 
causing a change of control, which might severely restrict the use of 
Ambac’s net operating losses.260 This leads to the sobering realization that 
the “rehabilitator is considering substantial amendments to the 
rehabilitation plan and/or the initiation of rehabilitation proceedings with 
respect to Ambac Assurance.”261 It appears that the IRS may have found 
another way to fight back. 
Meanwhile, Ambac Financial has asked the bankruptcy court to 
adjudicate the merits of the disputed refund.262 The complaint was sent to 
mediation, and there has been no result reached as of yet. Ambac Financial 
has also filed a plan of reorganization with the bankruptcy court.263 This 
plan threatens the Commissioner with the deconsolidation of the holding 
company with the insurance subsidiaries if the holding company cannot 
reach a settlement with the Commissioner.264 This would be accomplished 
by converting the Chapter 11 proceeding to a Chapter 7 liquidation, or by 
causing a change of control of Ambac Assurance by transferring its stock to 
different entities.265 The Commissioner responded that “[t]he [Ambac 
Financial] plan proposes to employ litigation to try to divert value from the 
Segregated Account. The Rehabilitator will vigorously contest that 
litigation.”266 
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The Ambac Assurance rehabilitation is testing the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act as never before since the authority of the bankruptcy court has been 
posed against the authority of the Rehabilitation Court. The Commissioner 
has been fighting the IRS and Ambac Financial for control of the 
rehabilitation process. If these disputes with the IRS and Ambac Financial 
can be resolved by settlements, prolonged litigation could potentially be 
avoided; but if the disputes cannot be settled, the Commissioner may put 
the entirety of Ambac Assurance into liquidation proceedings, permanently 
subordinating any claims of the holding company or the IRS to claims of 
policyholders. 
V. WOULD DODD-FRANK MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act267 
(Dodd-Frank) sets up a new Orderly Liquidation Authority.268 Dodd-Frank 
allows insurance companies and a group whose largest subsidiary is an 
insurance company to be designated for the new liquidation regime under  
§ 203(a)(1)(C) of the statute.269 This regime may affect the non-insurance 
entities that are part of insurance holding company families resulting in the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) serving as receiver; 
however, regulated insurance entities may only be taken into proceedings 
under state law pursuant to § 203(e).270 The FDIC has backup authority to 
take an insurance company into proceedings if a state regulator fails to do 
so within sixty days, but Dodd-Frank is unclear as to whether the FDIC or 
the state regulator would be the receiver in such proceedings.271 It says that 
the receivership will be “under the laws and requirements of the State,”272 
most of which require the state insurance regulator to be the receiver.273 
Since the bulk of the activity in Ambac took place in regulated insurance 
companies, there would likely be little difference. It is an interesting 
question whether the federal government could have used its new powers to 
force the General Account of Ambac into proceedings, but the Wisconsin 
Commissioner would likely have full control over it once it got there. 
CONCLUSION 
Ambac poses some amazing challenges to the way we have 
traditionally thought about insurance insolvency in this country. This case is 
not only massive in size but also deals with a company that wrote highly 
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specialized products that are more similar to those written by commercial 
and investment banks. The Commissioner in Wisconsin used means to 
tackle these gigantic crises that are different from traditional insurance 
insolvency procedures. First, these proceedings have challenged the way we 
think about priority, choosing to place some policyholders ahead of others. 
Second, they have changed the way we view the rights of creditors to take 
the value they would have received in liquidation. Third, they have adopted 
an English-style model, previously unknown in this country, to transfer 
policy liabilities. Fourth, the Ambac case has supercharged the force behind 
McCarran-Ferguson’s reverse preemption of federal law. 
Only time will tell if there will be enough claims-paying resources in 
the Ambac entities to discharge its policy liabilities. Many of Ambac’s 
exposures extend for decades. Uncertainty reigns in the market for 
municipal credit, and everyone’s crystal ball is especially cloudy on the 
future of residential real estate values. 
The battle for control of Ambac is raging. The world will be watching 
to see if the parties have made the right choices. 
